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Abstract: This paper uses county-level data from California to test whether ethnic 
fragmentation and other measures of diversity and social capital are systematically 
related to spending on productive local public goods that affect rural quality of life. The 
specific focus of this paper is the impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) of 1986, which brought about 400,000 new immigrants to California, on 
demographic composition in that state. This policy change was largely unexpected and 
created exogenous variation in the ethnic diversity of counties in California, particularly 
those counties where agricultural land use was most prevalent. Our econometric results 
suggest a negative correlation between ethnic fractionalization and local public good 
expenditure. In this context we also find some evidence that civic participation, as 
measured by voting rates, has the opposite effect of fractionalization on local public good 
outcomes. Potential implications of this finding for immigration policy reform are briefly 
discussed. 
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1  Introduction 
The Central Valley region of California has been characterized as a region of “poverty 
amid prosperity” (Martin and Taylor 1998). This region is the source of much of the US’s 
high value agricultural production; eight of the nation's top ten counties by value of 
agricultural production are in California and six of these are in the Central Valley (the 
region composed of the San Joaquin Valley and neighboring Sacramento Valley) 
(USDA/National Agricultural Statistics Service 1997). Poverty is also prevalent in this 
region, by both California and national standards. The percentage of persons living in 
poverty in Fresno and Tulare counties (at the heart of the San Joaquin Valley), for 
example, is comparable to that in metro Baltimore or Philadelphia. A larger fraction of 
families live in poverty in these counties than in Mississippi, Louisiana, or West Virginia 
(US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 2000). 
Poverty rates in the Central Valley are closely related to the region’s concentration in 
agriculture. About 800,000 people are employed as farmworkers in California at some 
time in the year, with annual incomes of $7,000-$8,000 (Martin 2003). These 
farmworkers and their families, which make up much of the Valley’s poor, are largely 
foreign-born Latinos (about 95 percent of farmworkers in California are foreign-born), 
many of whom are not authorized to be employed in the US (approximately 50 percent of 
farmworkers lack work authorization) (US Department of Labor 2000).  
This paper considers local public good outcomes in the context of agricultural 
communities in the US. We focus on counties in California with significant agricultural 
production and investigate empirically the determinants of local public good expenditures 
per capita. In these counties, with large numbers of immigrants and illegal residents, the 2 
community characteristics most salient to voters and residents may differ from those that 
determine local public good expenditure in urban areas. Our empirical analysis is 
motivated by a simple model of discriminatory community preferences that is closely 
related to the model developed by Cutler, Elmdorf, and Zeckhauser (1993) and yields 
testable predictions consistent with those arising from other models of voting behavior 
(e.g., Alesina, Baqir and Easterley 1999, among others). 
Inefficiently low public good provision may directly affect community welfare (e.g., 
public health infrastructure) and longer-run economic development prospects (e.g., 
education).
1As well as the public finance literature that considers how heterogeneous 
populations provide local public goods (e.g., Gramlich and Rubinfeld 1982, Rubinfeld 
1987), there is a growing body of empirical work that investigates whether local public 
good outcomes are related to income inequality and ethnic polarization or 
fractionalization (Vigdor 2004, Miguel and Gugerty 2002, Alesina, Baqir and Easterley 
1999, Poterba 1996, Glaeser, Scheinkman and Schleifer 1995, Cutler and Glaeser 1997, 
Cutler, Elmdorf, and Zeckhauser 1993). In the US, nearly all of this work is motivated by 
adverse outcomes in racially polarized cities and suggests that more fractionalized or 
polarized communities have worse local public good outcomes.
2 In contrast, this paper 
considers relatively rural communities which contain large numbers of recent 
immigrants. Our motivation is similar to that of other work however; we seek to address 
                                                 
1 In the context of developing countries, ethnic diversity or fractionalization and other measures of 
relatively low social capital appear to be correlated with adverse economic and institutional outcomes at the 
national level (Easterly and Levine 1997, Mauro 1995, Knack and Keefer 1997) 
2 The agricultural counties of California may be as “fractionalized” as the metropolitan areas of major US 
cities. By income, education, language, and ethnicity, farmworkers and other recent immigrants differ on 
average from landowners, farm managers, and other generally native-born residents of the Central Valley. 
Just as Alesina, Baqir, and Easterley (1999) note that popular discussions often compare American cities to 
“Third World countries,” similar language can be found in the popular press when discussing California’s 
Central Valley (e.g., Kassler 2000). 3 
the question of whether demographic characteristics of communities are connected to 
economic outcomes. 
By focusing on counties in a single state we gain access to a relatively long time 
series of county-level data (covering the years 1979-2000). The time period covered by 
our data includes a significant policy change, which allows us to use the econometric 
techniques of program evaluation to treat the endogenous relationship between ethnic 
diversity, income, and local public goods expenditure. Much of the existing empirical 
evidence on this question is hampered by concerns about reverse causality. Because of 
the possibility of Tiebout (1958) sorting, it is difficult to determine whether ethnic 
diversity, or other measures of heterogeneity, cause a particular outcome to occur (e.g., 
lower provision of local public goods) or if the fact than an outcome occurs encourages 
increased fractionalization. This paper attempts to overcome this difficulty. It capitalizes 
on the fact that in counties in California in which immigrants are a relatively large 
fraction of the population immigration policy reform created an exogenous variation in 
the ethnic diversity of residents during the period we study. 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1987 (IRCA), gave temporary and 
ultimately permanent residence to approximately 700,000 so-called Special Agricultural 
Workers (SAW) in California over a period of three years (US Department of Labor 
1993). Perhaps 400,000 beneficiaries were new residents as the amnesty was not 
restricted to people currently residing in the US and the ex ante prediction of the number 
of applications was about 300,000 (Orrenius and Zavodny 2003).  
Our identification strategy uses the fact that the SAW program acts an exogenous 
source of variation in ethnic fractionalization in California counties. In particular, our 4 
econometric strategy relies on the fact that more SAW participants settle in regions where 
a larger fraction of land is devoted to agriculture. We use this variation in program 
intensity across counties and the timing of the amnesty to create instruments for ethnic 
fractionalization. The validity of the identification strategy is tested.
3 
Our results are generally consistent with the existing literature that has identified a 
negative correlation between ethnic fractionalization and local public good expenditure. 
In this context we also find some evidence that civic participation, as measured by voting 
rates, has the opposite effect of fractionalization on local public good outcomes. As an 
alternative measure of social capital (Coleman 1990, Putnam 1993), this is consistent 
with the findings of Miguel and Gugerty (2002) that communities that are able to impose 
internal social sanctions choose higher levels of public good provision. This finding may 
also have implications for assessment of alternative future immigration policies, a 
possibility to which we return in the conclusion of this paper. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a simple 
model of individual preferences that predicts a correlation between community 
characteristics and local public good provision. Section 3 discusses the data used in 
econometric analysis and IRCA, a major policy reform implemented during the period 
under consideration. We discuss threats to the validity of the identification strategy and 
                                                 
3 Impacts of immigration shocks and policy changes have been studied by Card (1990) and Saiz (2003), 
who investigate the impact of the Mariel Boatlift on labor and housing market outcomes in Miami. The 
effect of IRCA on farm labor market outcomes and, indirectly, agricultural commodity prices has been 
studied by Tran and Perloff (2002), Gunter, Jarrett and Duffield (1992) and Taylor and Thilmany (1993). 
This work is largely motivated by testing whether the stated goal of IRCA—creating a smaller, more legal 
farmworker labor force—was achieved. We discuss briefly assessments of IRCA in this respect later in this 
paper. Our identification strategy is related to that used by Banasak and Raphael (2001) to investigate 
whether the penalties imposed on firms for hiring illegal immigrants as a result of IRCA resulted in 
discrimination against Latino workers. They use that fact that penalties for hiring undocumented workers 
were phased-in at different rates in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors to create differential 
treatment groups. 5 
robustness checks. Section 4 presents our econometric strategy and results. Section 5 
concludes. 
2  Model 
To motivate our econometric analysis of the impact of ethnic fractionalization on local 
public good expenditure outcomes we present a simple model that is related to a model of 
spending on local public goods first proposed by Cutler, Elmdorf, and Zeckhauser 
(1993). In this model, individual utility is a function of consumption (income less taxes) 
public goods (financed through income taxes and provided at the level demanded by the 
median voter) and, crucially, community welfare where the welfare of members of 
different groups within the community may be weighted differently. We discuss 
comparative statics of the demand for local public goods by a representative agent in the 
case in which there are two groups in a community, perhaps immigrant farmworkers and 
all other individuals, and the relative proportion of group members changes though the 
identity of the median voter does not. We also consider a case in which all consumers pay 
an equal share of taxes and a case in which one group caries a larger portion of the tax 
burden. The model provides one possible justification for a correlation between local 
public good expenditure patterns and community characteristics. 
Consider a community of fixed population in which there are two groups of 
individuals, J1, of size n1 and J2 of size n2 where n1 + n2 = N, the total population of the 
community. There are K local public goods provided in the community in total and at 
least a portion of the benefits associated with these goods are private (i.e., there is a 
redistributional element to these goods) but the level of benefits do not differ across 
groups. For a particular good k, a member of group J1 receives benefits g1k. 6 
Tax revenue is used to pay the cost of providing all K goods to groups J1 and J2 and 
totals the amount GT. For simplicity, we assume that each member of the broader 
community pays an equal fraction of taxes, which implies that the group J1 will pay (n1 / 
N) * GT in total. Thus, total expenditure on local public goods in the community can be 
calculated by summing across the consumption of goods for individuals in each group 
and then summing the consumption of groups J1 and J2.  
To determine the circumstances under which community characteristics may affect 
local public good expenditure even when all individuals value the same local public 
goods, we can write down a utility function of the following form: 
( 1 )       u1 = U(y1 - t1,G1,c1). 
Here, the utility of an individual in group J1 (the group is denoted by numeric subscripts) 
is a function of after-tax income (y1 - t1), the vector G1, in which each element is the 
amount of good k, g1k, that a member of group J1 receives, and a community welfare 
function c1.
4 Group J2 individuals have analogous utility functions.  
Cutler, Elmdorf, and Zeckhauser (1993) show that the functional form of c1 
determines whether community characteristics affect local public good outcomes in this 
model. One case in which this will occur is when agents exhibit discriminatory 
preferences and the function c1 takes the following form: 
(2)     c1(n1,n2,G) = w11n1v1(G1) + w12 n2v2(G2). 
                                                 
4 The inclusion of c1 in the individual utility function makes agents in this model different from the purely 
selfish agents in the traditional public choice model. Note that if c1 is not an element of the utility function 
then member of group J1 will desire that public good be provided until the marginal utility forgone by 
paying an additional $1 of taxes is equal to the marginal benefit of the public good k that can be purchased 
with $1. Mathematically, for good k this will occur when Uy(n1 / N) = Ug1k, where the subscripts on the U 
function indicate derivatives. 7 
In this case, for i = 1,2, w1i is the weight that each member of group J1 places on the 
welfare of group Ji and vi(Gi) is the benefit to each member of group i who receives Gi. 
For an individual in group J1, desired spending on good k occurs at the point where: 
(3)     Uy(n1 / N) = Ug1k * Uc (w11n1v1gk(G1) + w12 n2v2gk(G2)). 
In the case that w11 = w12, preferences are not discriminatory. When these weights are not 
equal, agents weight the welfare of people outside their group differently from people 
within their group. 
To investigate the implications of this model for agricultural counties in California, 
we consider three scenarios. First, consider the case in which the identity of the median 
voter, whose preferences determine aggregate spending on all K goods, is like that of an 
individual in group J1 and does not change if n1 and n2 change (perhaps because 
individuals in group J2 cannot vote). In this case, as the proportion of individuals in group 
J2 increases (holding the total population fixed), desired, and realized, spending on good 
k falls if w11 > w12. 
A second scenario occurs when the tax share of individuals in group J1 is larger than 
the tax share of individuals in group J2 (perhaps because the members of group J1 are 
more likely to own property). If w11 > w12 desired spending on good k will fall relatively 
faster than in the first scenario as the proportion of individuals in group J2 increases. 
There is a third possibility that increasing the proportion of individuals in group J2 
shifts the identity of the median voter towards individuals who place a greater weight on 
the welfare of group J2. Discriminatory preferences imply declining local public good 
spending with increasing diversity, by at a slower rate than in the first scenario. 8 
3  Data and program description 
3.1  Data 
The data used in this paper are a set of county-level statistics for 35 counties in California 
for the period 1979-2000. The counties in the sample are those for which the value of 
agricultural production exceeded $100 million in 2000 and, essentially, include all 
counties in California except the metropolitan core of the Bay Area, timber growing 
regions of the North, and the largely mountainous eastern edge of the state. All counties 
that were estimated to have more than 10,500 farmworkers residing in them in 1990 are 
included in the sample (Bugarin and Lopez 1998). Counties with the highest value of 
agricultural output have among the highest poverty rates in the state as well. 
County financial data, including expenditure on roads, expenditures on sanitation and 
water infrastructure, and levels of transfers from the Federal and State government 
(revenue that is often earmarked for particular projects or types of projects) comes from 
the California Institute for County Government (CICG) for the period 1985-2000.
5 CICG 
also makes available data on county government revenue by source (e.g., sales or 
property taxes), but since counties in California have little control over revenue levels 
(Hill 1998), we do not use this data.
6 We do use information from CICG on whether a 
county is a “general law” or “charter” county; terminology that distinguishes two possible 
ways of electing local government in California. Charter counties have somewhat more 
freedom about the offices that will be filled by election as opposed to appointment and 
thus spending in these counties may be relatively more responsive to local tastes. 
Summary statistics are shown in table 1; transfers per capita are much higher than road 
                                                 
5 All monetary data is deflated to constant 1995 dollars using the Los Angeles regional Consumer Price 
Index as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
6 Future versions of this paper will analyze water and sanitation expenditure in detail. This analysis is 
omitted here due to space constraints.  9 
expenditure, which is in turn much higher than water and flood control expenditure. 
There is significant variation across counties. 
County demographic characteristics (also summarized in table 1) come from the US 
Census City and County Data Books (fraction of the population below the poverty line, 
fraction of the population with a college degree, and number of votes cast in elections), 
the California Department of Finance (DOF) (population by age and ethnic classification
7 
and population living in unincorporated areas of counties), RAND California (violent 
crimes per 100,000 population, personal income), and the USDA/National Agricultural 
Statistical Service (harvested acres).
8 The data from the City and County Data Books is 
not available for all years that we study, so we include in our analysis information about 
the income distribution, voting, and education attainment at the outset of the period.  
Ethnic fractionalization, a standard measure of ethnic diversity in the empirical 
literature on this topic is calcualted as 1 - Σi(Racei)
2 and is defined as the probability that 
two people picked at random in a region will be of different ethnicities.
9 There is 
noticeable state-wide upward trend in ethnic fractionalization, though for at least some 
counties there appears to be a change in this trend in the mid to late 1980s. This coincides 
                                                 
7 Unlike the US Census data, “Hispanic” is included as an explicit category in the DOF’s reported 
population by ethnic group data. The categories included are: white, black, Asian, Hispanic, and American 
Indian. These categories sum to the total population figures.  
8 In non-census years DOF population estimates are generated by analyzing driver’s license data and birth 
and death certificates. Thus, it may undercount illegal residents as California law requires proof of legal 
residency to receive a license to drive. However, personal income data from RAND California is based on 
estimates made by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The wages and salaries component included 
in this calculation of personal income is generated from data supplied to BEA from state employment 
security agencies (ESAs) that summarizes quarterly state unemployment insurance contribution reports 
filed with ESAs by employers. For California, these estimates include farmworkers because state law 
requires that farmworkers be provided with unemployment insurance (in contrast to all other states except 
Arizona) (BEA 2001). Thus, we suspect that illegal residents are generally excluded from the population 
data and generally included in the income data. 
9 Vigdor (2004) derives this fractionalization index, first introduced in the economics literature by Mauro 
(1995) as an element of an individual’s “decision to act” to provide a local public good. See Alesina et al. 
(2003) for further discussion of measures of diversity in econometric analysis. 10 
with the period in which the IRCA was passed and amnesty was provided to certain 
agricultural workers, an exogenous source of change in the ethnic composition of the 
sample counties that we exploit in our econometric analysis. 
3.2  The Immigration Reform and Control Act 
Among other legislative changes, IRCA gave amnesty to Special Agricultural 
Workers (SAW), people who had worked as agricultural workers for at least 90 days 
between May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986 or for a total of 90 days during the period May 1, 
1983 and May 1, 1986. Under the SAW provisions, a total of about 1 million applications 
for legal permanent resident status were granted, about 700,000 of these were in 
California (US Department of Labor 1993). At both the national and state level, 
applications far exceeded predicted levels (about 300,000 in total) leading observers to 
conclude that the program gave residence to many people living in Mexico in 1986 
(Martin 2003, Orrenius and Zavodny 2003).
10 The time line of the IRCA SAW reforms is 
summarized in table 2. 
IRCA had a limited impact on the composition of the electorate relative to the number 
of people who received amnesty under the program. While temporary residency permits 
were provided in 1988, and employer sanctions were in place in 1989, the vast majority 
of IRCA permanent residency approvals were given in 1991 (see table 2). Citizenship 
through naturalization became possible for participants in 1994. Thus, IRCA did not 
change the identity of the median voter prior to that year. Even after 1994, not all IRCA 
long-term permanent residents eligible for citizenship elected to naturalize. As of 2001, 
                                                 
10 IRCA also introduced penalties for employers that were found to be “knowingly” employing 
undocumented workers. The amnesty was intended to act as a cushion against predicted labor shortages as 
a result of these sanctions (Tran and Perloff 2002, GAO 1989). 11 
only about one-third of Mexican-born IRCA immigrants had elected to become US 
citizens (Rytina 2002). 
Long-run impacts of the SAW program appear to differ from the short run effects of 
the program. Surveys conducted in 1989-91 found that 10 percent of the farmworkers in 
California were undocumented and about 60 percent of farmworkers were SAW program 
participants (US Department of Labor 1993). The more farmworkers living in a particular 
county, the greater the impact of the SAW program would be on the average status of a 
county’s residents. 
By 1998, Department of Labor surveys found that about 50 percent of farmworkers 
were undocumented (US Department of Labor 2000). This is consistent with the 
contention that SAW program participants gradually moved out of agriculture and were 
replaced with new undocumented workers (Martin 2003, Taylor and Thilmany 1993). 
However, using the Labor Department survey data, Tran and Perloff (2002) find that 
SAW participants are somewhat more likely than undocumented workers to remain 
agriculture and that IRCA did relatively little to change the dynamics of the agricultural 
labor market; it simply gave residency rights to a fairly large group of relatively similar 
immigrants in a short time period. This suggests that the identification strategy we use in 
this paper will be valid for the period around the time of the reform. However, as more 
SAW participants move out of agriculture, there will be less correlation between the 
ethnic diversity of citizens and residents of a county and land devoted to agriculture. We 
consider this issue further in econometric analysis.  
If IRCA was an endogenous policy response to changes in ethnic diversity in 
agricultural regions, this may impact the validity of our estimation strategy. The stated 12 
goal of IRCA was to reduce reliance on new immigrants for labor in the agricultural 
sector (GAO 1989). Importantly for our identification strategy however, there appears to 
have been little expectation that the program would change the ethnic composition of the 
farm labor force; it was hoped that the SAW program participants, overwhelmingly 
Mexican in origin, would continue to work in agriculture. 
The validity of our estimation strategy is also impacted if IRCA was anticipated by 
amnesty applicants or current residents. For example, suppose that people elected to work 
in agriculture in 1985 or moved to the US in 1985 because they anticipated it would 
increase their chances of receiving amnesty. Alternatively, if California residents 
anticipated future immigrants, this might have caused them to reduce local public good 
spending because of anticipated free-riding by future residents (Schultz and Sjostrom 
2001). In either case we will underestimate the effect of IRCA on ethnic fractionalization 
by looking at changes in outcome variables before and after 1988. In practice, IRCA 
passage appears have been unexpected. Legislation to reform immigration policy that 
failed to become law was regularly before both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate prior to 1986 (Orrenius and Zavodny 2003). 
Perhaps the most important threat to validity is the possibility of omitted interactions 
that make drawing inferences difficult. The data reflect a significant upward trend in 
fractionalization in all years in the sample and the pattern of increase in ethnic 
fractionalization could vary systematically across counties over time by agricultural land 
use for reasons unrelated to IRCA. If there were other policy changes at the time of IRCA 
that affect local public good expenditure in agricultural counties, our identification 
strategy would be inappropriate. There are several possible policy changes that occurred 13 
in this period that may affect public good expenditure; however none seem to affect 
communities differently depending on the importance of agriculture in the communities.  
One candidate policy change comes from IRCA itself. Non-agricultural workers also 
received amnesty as part of IRCA. People unlawfully living in the US since 1982 were 
granted permanent residency regardless of sector of employment. About 1.5 million 
people received permanent residency as a result of this element of IRCA. These 
immigrants lived throughout the US; perhaps 38,000 of them worked in agriculture in 
California (US Department of Labor 2000). Most so-called pre-1982 immigrants worked 
in low-skilled labor or service sectors at the time of the amnesty and at the time they 
received permanent residence (Rytina 2002). 
A state ballot measure called Proposition 99 raised cigarette taxes in 1989 in 
California with the additional revenue earmarked for spending on public health by 
counties additional to 1988 levels (California Legislative Analyst’s Office 1995). The 
impact of this policy would vary across counties according to the volume of transactions 
eligible to be taxed. Thus, Proposition 99 does not disproportionately affect agricultural 
counties.
11 In light of this policy change however, our econometric analysis does not 
consider public health programs and we focus on expenditure per capita rather than local 
public goods spending as a fraction of total expenditure because counties in California 
received a new revenue source in 1988 as a result of the passage of Proposition 99. 
                                                 
11 We test this proposition by calculating the correlation between the fraction of land devoted to agriculture 
in 1988 and the change in public health expenditure per capita between 1988 and 1990. The correlation 
coefficient is -0.0074, with a significance level of 0.95. Over this period, public health expenditure per 
capita increased by 10 percent on average. 14 
4  Econometric estimation strategy and results 
4.1  Empirical specification 
Our estimation strategy focuses on explaining local public good expenditure per capita in 
California agricultural counties. The explanatory variable of primary interest is a measure 
of ethnic diversity. The model presented in section 2 predicts a negative relationship 
between ethnic diversity and local public goods expenditure per capita if people have 
discriminatory preferences. This effect should be smaller if the identity of the median 
voter changes as community composition changes. 
Instrumental variables techniques are used to address the endogenous relationship 
between ethnic diversity and local public good expenditure. The primary instrument used 
in the first stage is the interaction of the variables “after IRCA” and the fraction of a 
county’s land devoted to harvested agriculture. This is a valid instrument if (1) IRCA did 
not directly affect local public good expenditure, (2) the policy reform was an exogenous 
source of variation in county ethnic composition, and (3) the intensity of the intervention 
varied across counties with agricultural land use.  
The main empirical specification is presented in equation 4. The outcome measure Yit 
is defined as road expenditure per capita in county i at time t. We choose this class of 
local public goods because they have been the subject of study in other papers related to 
ours, thus making our results relatively comparable to other work (i.e., Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterley 1999). The variable FRACit is a measure of local ethnic diversity. Mit is 
personal income per capita and Xit is a vector of county demographic and financial 
control variables. In some specifications we control for county fixed effects, (µi) to 
account for time-invariant county characteristics that may affect local public good 
expenditure levels (e.g., topography in the case of roads). We do control for time fixed 15 
effects (Σtτt1YEARt) in most specifications, but also replace these fixed effects with a 
variable AFTERt that is an indicator variable that takes the value “1” if the year is after 
the IRCA reforms (we define this year as 1988 because this was the first year that 
permanent residency was awarded and the first year that employers faced sanctions for 
knowingly hiring illegal workers) in the simplest regression specifications. The 
disturbance term eit is allowed to be correlated across years for the same county. Equation 
4 is: 
(4)  Yit = µi + βFRACit + aAGAREAit + cAFTERt + γMit +Xit` δ + eit. 
Equation 4 estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) produces biased estimates of 
β because the ethnic composition of a particular community are likely endogenously 
related to local public good expenditure. To treat this endogeneity, we estimate a first-
stage regression, the main variant of which is presented in equation 5. A similar concern 
exists for the estimated coefficient on income and we also use IV techniques strategy to 
treat this endogeneity. We begin by focusing on explaining the instrumental variables 
strategy in detail in the case ethnic diversity. Equation 5 is: 
(5)   FRACit = µi1 + a1AGAREAit + b1(AFTER * AGAREA)it + c1AFTERt +  γ1Mit + Xit`δ1 + vit. 
In this specification (where the additional coefficient subscript of the number “1” is 
included to emphasize that this is the first-stage regression) we estimate the impact of the 
IRCA program on ethnic diversity in county i at time t, conditional on the other 
independent variables. This equation can be interpreted as a “differences” regression in 
which differential “treatment” groups are created depending on the fraction of land 
devoted to agriculture. The variable AFTER, defined above, can be replaced by time fixed 
effects to allow for year-specific impacts of IRCA. The variable AGAREA is measured 
as thousands of harvested acre per square mile in county i at time t. 16 
4.2  Testing the first-stage identification strategy 
As a first step to determining if this identification strategy is valid, table 3 presents a 
series of regressions that are closely related to equation 2. The specification is 
parsimonious; no Xit control variables are included. These regressions are intended to 
determine whether there is a change in ethnic fractionalization in the sample counties as a 
result of IRCA. Consider the regression in column 1; in this simple framework, the 
overall impact of IRCA is captured by the coefficient on AFTER, the differential impact 
on agricultural counties is captured by the coefficient on AFTER * AGAREA plus the 
coefficient on AGAREA, and the difference in outcomes between more agricultural 
counties and less agricultural counties prior to the policy change is captured by the 
coefficient on AGAREA. In this regression all coefficient estimates are positive, as 
expected, but only the coefficient on AFTER is significant.
12 
The remaining regressions in table 3 build upon the simplest specification, replacing 
AFTER with time fixed effects, including income per capita as a control variable, and, to 
address the concern that income per capita and ethnic fractionalization are themselves 
endogenously related, instrumenting for income with its five-year lagged value in the 
regressions in columns 4 and 5. In all specifications, the point estimates of b1 are positive, 
as expected given the nature of IRCA, though not always individually significant. In 
regressions in columns 4, and 5, a1 and b1 are jointly significantly different than zero. 
After controlling for income per capita, these regressions provide some suggestive 
evidence that ethnic diversity in the sample counties was higher after IRCA than before 
                                                 
12 Simply regressing ethnic fractionalization on a series of time fixed effects is another means of testing 
whether IRCA affected ethnic diversity. When we estimate this regression, we find that the coefficient 
estimates on the year dummy variables are positive and increase in absolute value at a decreasing rate. 
There is no obvious year in which the trend changes. This finding is robust to including income per capita 
and county fixed effects as additional explanatory variables and confirms the pattern seen in figure 1; 
increasing ethnic fractionalization in California counties prior to IRCA.  17 
and the effect was greater in counties with a higher fraction of land devoted to 
agriculture.
13 
The key identifying assumption of our econometric model is that, in the absence of 
IRCA, b1 = 0. This assumption should not be taken for granted. To test the identification 
assumption we take two complementary approaches, both of which are available to us 
because of the relatively long period of data available.  
As a first test of the identification assumption, we restrict our attention to the data for 
the years prior to 1987 when IRCA had not been passed and run a series of “false 
experiments.” That is, we estimated versions of equation 3 in table 3 for assuming that 
AFTER does not refer to 1988 but instead refers to the years beginning 1981-1986 
sequentially. Finding significant coefficient estimates on the variable AFTER * AGAREA 
in these regressions would be evidence against our identifying assumption that a 
“treatment” occurred in 1988 that did not occur in earlier years. In these regressions, not 
presented due to space constraints, the coefficient on the variable AFTER * AGAREA is 
always insignificantly different from zero (the largest t statistic is 0.40 when the false 
treatment year is 1986 and the point estimate is 0.02) and is significantly different than 
the average of the point estimates on the interaction term in the regressions in columns 3-
5 (F(1,34) = 1.42, Prob > F=0.24 when the false treatment year is 1986).
14 This is some 
                                                 
13 To provide a sense of the order of magnitude of change in ethnic diversity implied by these estimates, 
consider the coefficient estimates in the regression in column 4. For a county of sample average 
fractionalization, income per capita of $20,000 in 1987 and 1988, and300 harvested acres per square mile 
in both years, these estimated coefficients imply a 4 percent increase in ethnic fractionalization as a result 
of IRCA.  
14 The sample size of the regressions for the period before IRCA is 215 county-year observations, 
significantly smaller than the sample size in the unrestricted regressions. However, if the regressions in 
table 4 are estimated with the period restricted to 1985-1990 (sample size 205 county-year observations), 
the significance of the coefficient on the interaction term is increased all cases, not reduced. Point estimates 
remain roughly similar to those reported in table 4. This is consistent with the discussion of IRCA in 
section 3.2; SAW program participants gradually move out of agriculture after 1988.  18 
suggestive evidence that the identification strategy is reasonable though the coefficient 
estimates in table 3 are somewhat imprecise.  
Our second approach to testing the identification assumptions underlying the 
regressions in table 3 uses all years of data. We estimate a regression of the form: 
(6) FRACit = Σtat1`AGAREAit + Σtbt1`(AFTERYRX * AGAREA)it + γ1`Mit + Σtτt1`YEARt + uit, 
in which the single interaction term in equation 3 is replaced with a series of interaction 
terms (and coefficients now have a “prime” appended to them to differentiate their values 
from those in equation 5). This test relies on the fact that the estimated coefficient on 
variables that are the interaction of AFTER YR X, where AFTER YR X takes the value 1 
for years other than 1988, and AGAREA should equal zero after controlling for AFTER 
YR 1988*AGAREA if 1988 is in fact the year in which exogenous change in ethnic 
fractionalization occurred. The estimated values of bt1` and the 95 percent confidence 
interval are plotted in figure 2. The estimates appear to be equal to zero for all years 
expect 1988 and 1994.
15 Because it provides support for the contention that an exogenous 
change occurred in 1988 did not occur in other years, this graph is additional support for 
our identification strategy.  
Given the fairly imprecise coefficient estimates in table 3, our results may be 
sensitive to the choice of a function form (Meyer 1995). Figure 2 plots ethnic 
fractionalization against AFTER*AGAREA, conditional on harvested area, “after IRCA” 
and income per capita. The linear regression line corresponds to the OLS estimate of 
equation 2 excluding county fixed effects and the vector Xit (and the coefficient estimates 
                                                 
15Interestingly, 1994 is the year that Proposition 187 was passed, a state ballot measure that denied public 
services to illegal immigrants. While the proposal was never implemented, the passage of Proposition 187 
encouraged many immigrants in California to change their status, becoming either permanent residents or 
citizens if possible (Public Policy Institute of California 1999). 19 
reported in column 3 of table 3). I also present a locally weighted regression of these 
variables; the shape of this regression line appears to justify a quadratic specification 
rather than a linear specification. Thus, a specification of equation 2 that is quadratic in 
AFTER*AGAREA will be used in later sections of the paper.
16 
Finally, because of the relatively low F statistic (around 20) on the excluded 
exogenous explanatory variables, AFTER*AGAREA and (AFTER*AGAREA)
2 in 
regressions like those in equation 5, we include lagged ethnic fractionalization as an 
additional explanatory variable in the first-stage regression when we run regressions to 
explain the determinants of local public good expenditures. We do this to address the 
concern that, when using weak instruments coefficient estimates on the variable of 
interest, ethnic fractionalization, will be biased towards OLS (Staiger and Stock 1997). 
Because we have more excluded exogenous variables than included endogenous variables 
(see the discussion of the instrumentation strategy for income per capita below), we can 
use a test of over-identifying restrictions to test the exogeneity of the instruments.  
A test of over-identifying restrictions is also important because of the possibility that 
the IRCA SAW program had a direct effect on public good expenditure and affected 
more agricultural counties disproportionately. This could happen as a result of congestion 
effects. Congestion can reduce the private benefits of local public goods and thus 
willingness to pay for these goods. New California residents were added as a result of 
IRCA, and anecdotally at least there is some suggestion that this was a concern in 
California.
17 
                                                 
16 The intuition for this quadratic specification is that relatively urban counties with little agricultural land 
area are more diverse that counties at the middle of the agricultural land distribution. 
17 For example, deterioration of quality as a result of congestion is one justification for proposals, like 
Proposition 187, to restrict immigrants’ access to public services (Clark and Schultz 1997). 20 
The strategy that we use to identify an exogenous source of variation in ethnic 
fractionalization is also a potentially plausible strategy to identify an instrument for 
income per capita because IRCA resulted in approximately 300,000 new residents of 
California who were relatively poor. However, other elements of IRCA also gave 
citizenship to existing California residents, whose wages likely increased in the short run 
as a result of this change in their residency status.
18 The net impact of IRCA on average 
incomes is theoretically ambiguous. We can estimate an equation analogous to equation 5 
in which the dependent variable is income per capita and ethnic diversity is included as 
an explanatory variable. Table 4 presents a series of regression results in which the 
dependent variable is income per capita. The coefficient estimates of interest, on the 
variables AFTER, AGAREA, and AFTER * AGAREA can be interpreted as before. In this 
case, counties with relatively more land in agriculture are relatively poor, incomes were 
higher after IRCA, though somewhat less so for counties with more land in agriculture. 
This is consistent with our understanding of the SAW program, new relatively poor 
residents at least initially worked in agriculture. 
Tests of the identification strategy for income proceed as outlined above for ethnic 
fractionalization. In this case however, there is reason to reject the hypothesis that an 
exogenous change occurred in 1988. For example, in figure 3 we present the coefficient 
estimates analogous to those in figure 1 in the case in which income per capita is the 
dependent variable. We see little evidence that 1988 differs from other years in the 
sample. Thus, we will proceed with a strategy in which income is instrumented for using 
                                                 
18 Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) estimate a wage premium of about 6 percent for legal immigration 
status among Latino workers using the IRCA reforms as a source of variation. 21 
its lagged value, rather than relying on the IRCA program to identify exogenous variation 
in this variable. 
4.3  Estimating the determinants of public good expenditure 
 
Table 5 presents regression estimates of the determinants of public good expenditure 
using our instrumental variables identified in section 4.2. The first equation in column 
one is a simple regression of roads expenditure per capita on ethnic fractionalization and 
income per capita using two-stage least squares (2SLS).
19 The coefficient on ethnic 
fractionalization is negative and significant. The magnitude of this coefficient estimate 
implies that for a county with a measure of ethic fractionalization equal to the sample 
mean (0.46) and road expenditure per capita equal to the sample mean ($55), a five 
percent increase in ethnic fractionalization is correlated with an 8 percent decrease in 
road expenditure per capita. While a fairly small amount, average expenditure per capita 
is also fairly low in this sample. The coefficient on income per capita is also negative in 
the first regression. It is close to zero.
20 
The regressions in columns 2 through 5 introduce additional control variables to the 
basic equation. The choice of control variables was made so that our regressions could be 
largely comparable to work that has been done comparing outcomes across US cities. 
This allows us to understand whether determinants of local public good spending 
                                                 
19Two-stage least squares (2SLS) is consistent but inefficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity (Hanson 
1982). In small samples, if heteroskedasticity is not present, 2SLS is preferable to GMM (Hyashi 2000). 
Thus, we test for heteroskedasticity as recommended by Baum Schaffer and Stillman (2002). In the 
regression in column 1 of table 6, the Pagan and Hall (1983) test statistic is 37.66. The null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity is rejected at conventional significance levels. However, the coefficient point estimates 
are very similar when the regressions in table 6 are performed using GMM and are significant in every 
regression specification. 
20 For comparison, in the analogous regression estimated using OLS, the coefficient estimate on ethnic 
fractionalization is -168.9 (standard error 69.9) and the coefficient estimate on income per capita is -0.002 
(standard error 0.001). 22 
agricultural areas differ in important ways from those in cities. This approach should also 
increase the comparability of our results with those of other authors. In each regression, 
the test of over-identifying restrictions using Hansen’s J statistic fails to reject the joint 
null hypothesis is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and 
are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. The estimated coefficient estimates 
on ethnic fractionalization and income are quite stable across specifications. 
In column 2 we introduce variables that measure the freedom of county government 
to allocate spending between categories. Counties with higher transfers from other levels 
of government have higher spending on roads, while so-called home rule or charter 
counties have less. This suggests that earmarked spending is often targeted to roads; 
county governments that have more discretion choose to spend less on this class of public 
goods regardless of ethnic composition. It is also possible that government transfers are 
directed to the most ethnically diverse and/or poorest counties, or, alternatively, that 
transfers disproportionately flow to counties in which residents are citizens. Vigdor 
(2004) presents evidence that households living in homogeneous communities are more 
likely to complete the census forms. Census responses in turn have implications for the 
levels of transfers because they are partly determined by population estimates. When 
transfers per capita are instrumented for using their five-year lagged values, coefficient 
estimates are very similar to those in table 5. 
In column 3 we introduce variables that account for some time-invariant 
characteristics of counties. We control for initial ethnic composition, education levels, 
poverty levels, and voting participation rates at the beginning of the sample period. While 
these variables are not strictly time invariant, education and poverty rates are likely to 23 
change relatively little over time and annual data on these county characteristics is not 
available. The most striking coefficient in this set is the strongly positive coefficient 
estimate on the fraction of the population voting in the 1980 election. One possible 
interpretation of this coefficient is that civic participation, or citizenship in particular, as 
measured by this variable, can counteract the negative effects of ethnic fractionalization 
on public good expenditures. This is consistent with the predictions of the model in 
section 2 in the case in which the identity of the median voter changes with average 
demographic characteristics of a community. 
Additional control variables are introduced in column 4. We add controls for the 
fraction of the population over age 65, total population and the violent crime rate. The 
coefficient estimate on the fraction of the population voting remains positive and 
significant in this regression. 
County fixed effects are included in the regression in column 5. Time-invariant 
control variables drop out of the equation in this case and all but one of the remaining 
control variables are insignificant. The estimated coefficients on ethnic fractionalization 
and income per capita are essentially unchanged from the initial specification. 
5  Conclusions 
This paper uses county-level data from California to test whether ethnic fragmentation 
and other measures of diversity and social capital are systematically related to spending 
on productive local public goods that affect rural quality of life. Our motivation is the 
“poverty in the midst of plenty” that characterizes California’s Central Valley. 
Using an instrumental variables strategy, we find that ethnic fractionalization is 
correlated with reduced local public good expenditure, but that increased civic 24 
participation or citizenship is correlated with higher levels of future public good 
expenditure. This may suggest that immigration policy reform that creates a class of guest 
workers will have more negative impacts on local public good expenditures than reform 
that provides the opportunity for naturalization.  
Future extensions of this work should investigate the strength of the IV strategy more; 
in particular, the intensity of the IRCA intervention that we use to identify changes in 
ethnic fractionalization should vary across counties according to the labor-intensity of 
harvested crops. Other public good should also be considered. The model in section 2 is 
most appropriate for public goods that have a redistributional element, as such water and 
sanitation investments will be important to study. 25 
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Notes: Graph shows the coefficients on the interaction term (Year after Year X?(0/1)*1000 harvested 
acres/mile
2) in a series of regressions that are identical to regression XX in table 4  Temporary residency 
was awarded to SAW program participants in 1987 and 1988.  
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Note: Non-parametric regression conditional on harvested area, Year after IRCA (1989) and income per capita. 
 
 
















































































Notes: Graph shows the coefficients on the interaction term (Year after Year X?(0/1)*1000 harvested 
acres/mile
2) in a series of regressions that are identical to regression 3 in table 5  except that “after 1989”is 
replaced with year X =for all X= 1985-1999. The vertical line at year=1989 indicates the first year in which 
permanent residency was awarded to agricultural workers under IRCA. The last year of awards was 1992. 30 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 Mean  Std  dev.  Min.  Max.  Obs.
County financial characteristics          
Expenditure on roads per capita ($1995)  54.97 49.36  4.14  431.16 560
Expenditure on water/flood control per capita ($1995)  1.01 2.24  0.00  17.77 560
Transfers from state/Fed. Gov’t per capita ($1995)  344.51 92.47  144.81  771.80 560
County has self-rule charter  0.26 0.44  0.00  1.00 770
          
County demographic characteristics          
Ethnic fractionalization  0.46 0.12  0.14  0.67 770
Income per capita ($1995)  21,212 4,903  13,951  55,064 770
Harvested acres (1,000) per square mile  0.30 0.16  0.00  0.71 735
Violent crime rate (per 100,000)  641 287  212  2,101 665
Fraction of population in unincorporated areas  0.37 0.19  0.05  0.78 770
Fraction of population over age 65  0.11 0.02  0.07  0.18 770
Log total population  12.45 1.41  9.46  16.10 770
Fraction of population below poverty line, 1979  0.12 0.03  0.06  0.17 726
Fraction of population with BA, 1980  0.16 0.05  0.09  0.27 770
Fraction of population over age 18 voting, 1988  0.49 0.7  0.34  0.63 770
Sources: County financial characteristics from California Institute for County Government, demographic 
characteristics from City and County Data Books (US Census), RAND California Business and Economic 
Statistics/ Bureau of Economic Analysis and California Department of Finance. 
 
Table 2 Special agricultural worker program time line 
Year Events 
1986  Immigration Reform and Control Act signed. 
1987  Amnesty application filing begins June 1.  
 
Amnesty and temporary residence granted to persons who demonstrate evidence of having 
worked on perishable crops (specifically, in "seasonal agricultural services") for at least "90 
person days" between May, 1985 and May, 1986.  
 
Applicants could apply from outside the US. 
1988  Application filing window closes November 30. 1.3 million applications received; 700,000 in 
California.  
 
Agricultural employers face penalties for employing illegal immigrants beginning in December. 
1989  SAW applicants become eligible for permanent residency December 1. 
1990  57,000 SAW program persons granted permanent residence.  
1991  920,000 SAW program persons granted permanent residence. 
1992  117,000 SAW program persons granted permanent residence. 









Table 3 Ethnic fractionalization and IRCA; Differences vary by agricultural land use 
Dependent variable: Ethnic fractionalization, it 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS OLS OLS  IV  IV 
1000 harvested acres/mile
2 (AGAREA)  0.049 0.053 0.117 0.142 0.144 
  [0.100] [0.102] [0.110] [0.125] [0.125] 
Year after IRCA?(0/1) (AFTER)  0.061  0.033  0.016  
 [0.015]***    [0.018]*  [0.014]   
Year after IRCA?(0/1)*1000 harvested 
acres/mile
2 (AFTER * AGAREA) 
0.011 0.007 0.075 0.079 0.078 
  [0.041] [0.040] [0.047]  [0.036]**  [0.036]** 
Income per capita (1995$)      0.007  0.009  0.0005 
     [0.004]**  [0.004]**  [0.0002]** 
Constant  0.414 0.373 0.241 0.213 0.226 
 [0.040]***  [0.040]***  [0.102]**  [0.118]*  [0.135]* 
Year  fixed  effects?  NO YES NO  NO YES 
Observations  735 735 735 595 595 
R-squared  0.07 0.10 0.14     
Number  of  counties  35 35 35 35 35 
root  MSE  0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 
In instrumental variables (IV) regressions current income per capita is instrumented for using the 5-year lag 
value. Coefficients and standard errors on income and interaction term are multiplied by 1000. Huber robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different from zero at 90% (*), 95% (**) 99% (***) confidence. 
Regression disturbance terms are clustered at the county level. 
 
Table 4 Income per capita and IRCA; Differences vary by agricultural land use 
Dependent variable: Income per capita, it 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS  OLS  IV IV IV 
1000 harvested acres/mile2  -9,134.44  -9,087.84 -9,630.62  -12,273.43  -12,209.19 
 [3,108.84]***  [3,143.98]**  [3,213.49]** [3,581.28]** [3,576.71]** 
Year after IRCA?(0/1)  3,826.61    3,201.72  2,035.91   
  [935.56]***   [835.76]***  [694.96]***  
Year after IRCA? (0/1) * 
1000 harvested acres/mile
2 
-8.52  -8.53 -8.63 -5.92 -5.90 
  [2.57]***  [2.59]*** [2.44]*** [2.03]*** [2.01]*** 
Ethnic fractionalization      10,167.30  9,077.98  8,296.67 
     [5,335.89]*  [5,799.35]  [5,827.01] 
Constant  23,168.80  23,034.28 18,958.86 20,642.66 25,576.05 
 [1,298.61]***  [1,254.76]**  [2,041.46]** [2,405.76]** [2,912.31]** 
Year  fixed  effects?  NO  YES NO YES NO 
Observations  735  735 735 595 595 
R-squared 0.23  0.27  0.29     
Number  of  counties  35  35 35 35 35 
root  MSE  4378.19  4312.01 4211.64 4406.50 4312.80 
In instrumental variables (IV) regressions current ethnic fractionalization is instrumented for using the 5-year 
lag value. Huber robust standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different from zero at 90% (*), 95% (**) 
99% (***) confidence. Regression disturbance terms are clustered at the county level.  
 32 
 
Table 5 Instrumental variables estimates- roads 
Dependent variable: Road expenditure per capita ($1995), it (1985-2000) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 IV  IV  IV  IV  IV 
Ethnic fractionalization  -173.24  -106.65  -346.73  -204.51  -327.10 
 [62.63]***  [63.61]*  [108.41]***  [86.20]**  [132.14]** 
Income per capita (1995$)  -0.002  0.002  0.001  -0.001  0.005 
 [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.002]*** 
Fraction pop. in unincorporated areas    18.90  14.95  -1.94  -93.32 
   [37.33]  [34.23]  [30.83]  [54.17]* 
Government transfers per capita    0.35  0.36  0.27  0.02 
   [0.12]***  [0.09]***  [0.08]***  [0.03] 
County has charter? (0/1)    -24.11  -14.21  -6.21   
   [10.12]**  [8.60]*  [9.03]   
Fraction 1980 pop. over 18 voting      414.12  302.07   
     [118.41]**  [120.13]**   
Fraction 1980 pop. with BA      -328.28  -151.47   
     [203.05]  [230.35]   
Fraction 1979 pop. below poverty line      -671.63  -651.51   
     [334.84]**  [342.62]*   
Ethnic fractionalization (1979)      404.14  304.45   
     [97.73]***  [75.90]***   
Fraction of pop. over 65        149.94  0.94 
       [321.61]  [442.99] 
Log of total pop.        -13.63  58.13 
       [3.63]***  [47.99] 
Violent crimes rate        0.00  0.00 
       [0.01]  [0.01] 
Year fixed effects?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
County fixed effects?  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Observations  560 560 528 528 560 
No.  counties  35.00 35.00 33.00 33.00 35.00 
Root  MSE  42.65 36.27 32.74 31.27 20.67 
1
st -stage F stat (ethnic frac.)  8247  8704  1743  1743  1247 
1
st -stage F stat (income per capita.)  630  1151  737  119  100 
Hansen J stat (test of OIR)  1.36  0.47  0.83  1.54  1.94 
Hansen  J  dof  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Hansen  J  p-value  0.51 0.79 0.66 0.46 0.38 
In instrumental variables (IV) regressions current ethnic fractionalization and current income per capita are 
instrumented for using the 5-year lag values, 1,000 harvested acres per square mile, the interaction of “after 
IRCA” and 1,000 harvested acres per square mile and the square of this interaction term. Huber robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Significantly different from zero at 90% (*), 95% (**) 99% (***) confidence. Regression 
disturbance terms are clustered at the county level in regressions that exclude county fixed effects. 
 
 
 